This article studies momentum in stock returns, focusing on the role of industry, size, and book-to-market (B/M) factors. Size and B/M portfolios exhibit momentum as strong as that in individual stocks and industries. The size and B/M portfolios are well diversified, so momentum cannot be attributed to firm-or industry-specific returns. Further, industry, size, and B/M portfolios are negatively autocorrelated and cross-serially correlated over intermediate horizons. The evidence suggests that stocks covary "too strongly" with each other. I argue that excess covariance, not underreaction, explains momentum in the portfolios.
past continue to beat the worst-performing stocks. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find a similar pattern in industry portfolios; the best-performing industries continue to beat the worst performers. I extend these results to size, B/M, and double-sorted size-B/M portfolios (5, 10, or 15 size and B/M portfolios; 9, 16, or 25 double-sorted portfolios). Momentum in these portfolios is as strong, and in some cases stronger, than momentum in individual stocks or industries. Moreover, size and B/M momentum is distinct from industry momentum in that neither subsumes the other.
These results are informative. They show, first, that momentum is robust and pervasive. It shows up in stocks and many types of portfolios, typically with very high significance (t-statistics > 4 are common). More importantly, the evidence shows that momentum cannot be attributed solely to firm-specific returns. The size and B/M portfolios are very well diversified. For example, size deciles each contain an average of 350 stocks from 1941 to 1999, while the 16 size-B/M portfolios each contain an average of 200 stocks from 1963 to 1999. The portfolios are also diversified across industries, and their returns seem best described as "macroeconomic." These observations imply one of two things: either firm-specific returns do not explain momentum at all, or there must be multiple sources of momentum in returns. A coherent story should explain why momentum shows up in, say, individual stocks and size quintiles, but vanishes at the market level (if anything, market returns show signs of reversals). Existing behavioral models do not explain this pattern.
The second set of tests focuses on the autocorrelation patterns in returns. It is well known that momentum is not the same as positive autocorrelation: momentum is a cross-sectional result (winners beat losers), while autocorrelation is a time-series phenomenon (a stock's past and future returns are correlated). Lo and MacKinlay (1990) show that momentum might be caused by autocorrelation in returns, lead-lag relations among stocks (cross-serial correlation), or cross-sectional dispersion in unconditional means. Intuitively a stock that outperformed other stocks in the past might continue to do so for three reasons: (1) the stock return is positively autocorrelated, so its own past return predicts high future returns; (2) the stock return is negatively correlated with the lagged returns on other stocks, so their poor performance predicts high future returns; and (3) the stock simply has a high unconditional mean relative to other stocks.
Empirically I find that lead-lag relations among stocks play an important role. The tests focus on industry, size, and B/M portfolios because autocorrelations are difficult to estimate for individual stocks. All three sets of portfolios are negatively auto-and cross-serially correlated. To be specific, I estimate the correlation between annual returns and future monthly returns for up to 18 months in the future. From 1941 to 1999, the correlation between an industry's annual return and its return two months later averages −0 005. The correlation declines steadily to −0 064 by month 10, after which it begins to rise. The estimates for size and B/M portfolios are similar, declining to approximately −0 070 by month 10 or 11. Cross-serial correlations among portfolios are also negative and follow the same pattern. Importantly, the lead-lag effects tend to be stronger than autocorrelations, and this difference creates momentum profits.
There are two explanations for these results. We might observe momentum, together with negative autocorrelation, if investors underreact to portfoliospecific news but overreact to macroeconomic events. Second, I show that excess covariance among stocks could produce a similar result, where "excess covariance" means, loosely, that prices covary more strongly than dividends. I present two models to illustrate how excess covariance can generate momentum. In the first model, investors mistakenly believe that news about one firm contains information about other firms. Prices covary more than they would if investors understood that news is firm specific. In the second model, prices covary too strongly because of fluctuations in the market risk premium. In both cases, momentum profits can be positive even though returns are negatively autocorrelated.
It is difficult to distinguish among these explanations. For example, they all predict that cross-serial correlations will be negative, but that portfoliospecific returns will be persistent (consistent with the evidence). I argue, however, that portfolio-specific underreaction does not explain size and B/M momentum. Most simply, it seems unlikely that investors would underreact to size-or B/M-related news, but overreact to market news. I emphasize, again, that the size and B/M portfolios are quite broad-5, 10, or 15 portfolios. News about these portfolios, like news about the overall market, is appropriately defined as macroeconomic. Thus a story in which investors react differently to idiosyncratic and macroeconomic news cannot explain the evidence. Instead, a model needs to explain why investors underreact to one type of macroeconomic news, but not another. That combination seems unlikely to me, and no behavior model predicts it.
Empirically the autocorrelation patterns in returns are inconsistent with portfolio-specific underreaction. Focusing on size quintiles, the large-stock portfolio has the least "idiosyncratic" risk. The underreaction story suggests therefore that it should be the most negatively autocorrelated, yet quintile 5's autocorrelation is actually the second closest to zero. Moreover, the leadlag relations among large and small stocks are too large to be explained by market reversals. Finally, I show that the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model absorbs much of the serial correlation in size and B/M portfolios (but not industries). Overall the evidence suggests that excess covariance among portfolios explains industry, size, and B/M momentum.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 1 establishes some basic results on momentum. Section 2 presents several models of momentum, emphasizing the potential role of excess covariance among stocks. Section 3 explores the autocorrelation and cross-serial correlation patterns in returns. Section 4 concludes.
Momentum in Stock Returns
I begin, in this section, with some basic empirical results on momentum. I estimate profits using individual stocks, industries, and size and B/M portfolios.
Data
The tests use all NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq common stocks on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The B/M portfolios require accounting data, so they are restricted to stocks on Compustat (the full CRSP sample is used for all other tests). The analysis considers the period 1941-1999, although Compustat restricts B/M portfolios to May 1963-December 1999. I exclude the pre-1941 data primarily to avoid the Depression era. Also, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that momentum is negligible, or even negative, from 1927 to 1940. (Including the earlier data does not alter the conclusions.)
For tests with individual stocks, firms must have 12 months of past returns (no restriction is placed on survival going forward). I also form industry, size, B/M, and double-sorted size-B/M portfolios. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that momentum can be traced to industry factors. I use size and B/M portfolios because there is much evidence that they capture risk factors in earnings and returns [e.g., Fama and French (1993, 1995) ].
The portfolios are constructed as follows. I calculate monthly returns for 15 industry portfolios, 5, 10, or 15 size and B/M portfolios, and 9, 16, or 25 size-B/M portfolios. Industries are based on two-digit SIC codes as reported by CRSP; they typically contain firms in consecutive two-digit codes, but some exceptions were made. Size portfolios are based on the market value of equity in the previous month. B/M portfolios are based on the ratio of book equity in the previous fiscal year to market equity in the previous month. Book values are updated four months after the fiscal year, and to reduce selection biases in Compustat, firms must have three years of accounting data before they are included in the B/M portfolios [see Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) ]. Following Fama and French (1993) , the breakpoints for size and B/M portfolios are determined by equally spaced NYSE percentiles. I report some tests using both equal-and value-weighted portfolios, but the majority of the article focuses on value-weighted portfolios. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the portfolios. For brevity, it shows only the industry portfolios, size deciles, and 16 size-B/M portfolios. The table reveals two important facts. First, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the portfolios. Average monthly returns range from 0.99% to 1.39% for the industries, 1.06% to 1.48% for the size portfolios, and 0.92% to 1.59% for the size-B/M portfolios. Standard deviations range from 3.46% for utilities up to 7.22% for small, low-B/M stocks. Second, the portfolios are quite well diversified. The average number of stocks in an industry is 231, in a size decile is 347, and in a size-B/M portfolio is 199. All but 
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Each month from January 1941 through December 1999, 15 industry and 10 size portfolios are formed from all NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks classified as ordinary common equity on CRSP. Size-B/M portfolios are formed from the subset of stocks with Compustat data, from May 1963 through December 1999. The industry portfolios are based on two-digit SIC codes; they typically, but not always, consist of firms in consecutive SIC codes. The size breakpoints are determined by NYSE deciles and the size-B/M breakpoints are determined by NYSE quartiles (using independent size and B/M sorts). The table reports the average return, standard deviation, and average number of firms for each portfolio. Returns are value weighted and measured in percent.
a Statistics for May 1963 -December 1999 three portfolios average more than 63 stocks and most have more than 100. Also, many tests will use portfolios divided less finely (e.g., size and B/M quintiles), which are even better diversified. Firm-specific factors should not be important for these portfolios.
Momentum profits
To test for momentum, I form portfolios that buy winners and sell losers. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) focus on decile-based strategies, which buy the top 10% of firms and sell the bottom 10%. I consider, instead, strategies that hold assets in proportion to their market-adjusted returns. Specifically, an asset's weight in month t is
where r k i t−1 equals the asset's k-month return ending in t − 1, r k m t−1 equals the corresponding return on the equal-weighted index, and N is the total number of stocks. This portfolio invests most heavily in stocks with the highest past returns, but any asset that performed above average is given positive weight. Since m is the equal-weighted index, it is easy to show that the weights sum to zero. To ease the interpretation of the results, the tables report profits for a rescaled version of the portfolio that invests $1 long and $1 short every month.
The portfolio defined by Equation (1) is more convenient than a decilebased strategy for two reasons. First, the portfolio invests in all assets, not just the extremes. This makes it easier to apply the strategy to industry, size, and B/M portfolios, which consist of anywhere from 5 to 25 portfolios. Second, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) show that profits from this strategy can be easily tied to the autocorrelation of returns, a fact that I will use later. Table 2 reports momentum profits using the different sets of portfolios. The strategies are based on past 12-month returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that, for individual stocks, strategies based on 3-to 12-month returns are profitable. In preliminary tests I found momentum in both 6-and 12-month returns, and I focus on 12-month returns for simplicity. The table shows profits for up to 18 months after formation. The table reports only the odd months, 1, 3, 5, etc., but the discussion will sometimes refer to the missing months.
Momentum is strong in both individual stocks and portfolios. The results for stocks and industries are consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) : momentum is significant for 7-9 months after formation, but quickly diminishes and turns to contrarian profits. Over the first 6 months, the cumulative profit from individual stocks is 3.55% per dollar long (t-statistic = 4 02). This compares with 3.04% for value-weighted The results for size and B/M portfolios are new. Profits for these portfolios are as strong, and in some instances stronger, than those from individual stocks or industries. Over the first 6 months, the cumulative profit from value-weighted size quintiles is 2.56%, from value-weighted B/M deciles is 2.14%, and from 25 value-weighted size-B/M portfolios is 3.23% (tstatistics = 4 16, 2.99, and 4.18, respectively).
2 In all cases, profits are larger for equal-weighted portfolios, with corresponding estimates of 3.02%, 4.61%, and 3.93% (t-statistics = 4 16, 5.97, and 4.93). The estimates imply large Sharpe ratios, equal to the t-statistics divided by √ T . In the full sample, a t-statistic of 4 implies a Sharpe ratio of 0.15, and in the truncated sample, it implies a Sharpe ratio of 0.19 (compared with 0.18 for the CRSP value-weighted index from 1941 to 1999). The table also shows that profits decay quite slowly, often remaining significant for the full 18 months. That contrasts with reversals after a year for individual stocks and industries.
Previous studies attribute momentum to firm-specific returns [e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , Grundy and Martin (2001) ]. However, that cannot explain the results for size and B/M portfolios. (Industry momentum is difficult to classify: industry returns are not "firm-specific," yet they might still be described as "idiosyncratic.") As mentioned earlier, the size and B/M portfolios are quite well diversified, typically containing more than 100 stocks. Further, Table 2 shows that using broader portfolios has almost no effect on profits: the estimates from 5 size portfolios are similar to those from 15, the estimates from 5 B/M portfolios are similar to those from 10, and the estimates from 9 double-sorted portfolios are similar to those from 25. These portfolios should contain little idiosyncratic risk, so it seems likely that macroeconomic factors, not firm-specific news, explain their momentum. Table 3 further explores the connection between firm, industry, and size-B/M momentum. The bottom line is that each appears to be distinct. Specifically, I repeat the tests in Table 2 , but now report benchmark-adjusted profits in place of raw profits. For individual stocks, momentum is adjusted for industry, size, or size-B/M effects: every stock is matched either to its industry, size decile, or size-B/M quintile (5 × 5 sort), and momentum profits are then estimated using returns in excess of the benchmark. For industry momentum, each stock is matched to its size decile or size-B/M quintile before forming the industries. The industry return is then the average of sizeor size-B/M-adjusted returns for stocks in that industry. Similarly, for size and B/M portfolios, each stock is matched to its industry before calculating returns for the portfolio.
The table shows that, in every case, profits are similar to the raw returns in Table 2 . For individual stocks, industry-adjusted profits equal 2.90% (tstatistic = 3 71) and size-B/M-adjusted profits equal 3.69% (t-statistic = 4 69) over the first 6 months. These compare with 3.55% for raw returns. [The results for industry-adjusted returns are consistent with the 12-month results Table 3 Benchmark-adjusted profits, 1941-1999 The table reports benchmark-adjusted profits for momentum strategies based on past 12-month returns. The strategies are the same as those in Table 2 of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) .] 3 Similarly industry momentum seems to be distinct from size and size-BM momentum. The benchmark-adjusted profits from any of the portfolio-based strategies have about the same magnitude, and follow the same patterns, as the raw profits in Table 2 . The statistical significance of industry momentum drops slightly compared with Table 2 , while the significance of size and B/M momentum actually goes up.
The evidence in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that momentum is a pervasive feature of returns. It shows up, separately and quite strongly, in individual stocks, industries, and size and B/M portfolios. Perhaps more importantly, momentum appears to be both a micro-and macroeconomic phenomenon. The macroeconomic component is, to my knowledge, new to this article. 4 The results suggest two possibilities: either the standard explanation for momentum, which attributes it to firm-specific returns, is wrong, or there are multiple sources of momentum in returns. Distinguishing between these possibilities is difficult. The remainder of the article will focus on the macroeconomic component, but I will offer several explanations that might apply to both firm and portfolio momentum. Ultimately, however, the article will have little to say directly about individual-stock momentum.
Sources of Momentum
The evidence above suggests that firm-specific returns do not fully explain momentum. This section discusses in more detail the potential sources of momentum. I present several models that generate momentum in quite different ways. The models illustrate a range of price behavior, but they are not meant to be entirely accurate descriptions of stock prices, nor to span all the possible sources of momentum.
Framework
It is useful to begin with a general framework for thinking about momentum. I follow the approach of Lo and MacKinlay (1990) , who emphasize that profits depend on both autocorrelations and the lead-lag relations among stocks.
For simplicity, the analysis focuses on one-period returns (the results are easily adapted to multiple-period returns; see footnote 5). I am interested in a momentum portfolio like the one used in Section 1. Specifically, the portfolio weight of asset i in month t equals
where r i t−1 is the asset's return in month t − 1 and r m t−1 is the return on the equal-weighted index in month t − 1. Profits for this portfolio can be easily tied to the autocorrelation and cross-serial correlation of returns. Assume that returns have unconditional mean ≡ E r t and autocovariance matrix ≡ E r t−1 − r t − . The portfolio return in month t equals
and the expected profit is
where i and m are the autocovariances of asset i and the equal-weighted index, respectively. Equation (4) shows that profits depend on the magnitude of asset autocovariances relative to the market's autocovariance. In matrix notation, the average autocovariance equals tr( /N and the autocovariance of the market portfolio equals /N 2 , where tr(·) denotes the sum of the diagonals and is a vector of ones. Therefore
where 2 is the cross-sectional variance of unconditional expected returns [collecting the i and m terms in Equation (4)]. The second line rearranges the first to isolate the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of . 5 This decomposition says that momentum can arise in three ways. First, stocks might be positively autocorrelated, implying that a firm with a high return today is expected to have high returns in the future. Second, crossserial correlations might be negative, implying that a firm with a high return today predicts that other firms will have low returns in the future. In this case, the stock does relatively well in the future only because other stocks do poorly. (We will see below that this phenomenon is closely linked to "excess" covariance among stocks.) The third term arises because momentum strategies, by their nature, tend to buy stocks with high unconditional means: on average, stocks with the highest unconditional expected returns also have the highest realized returns. Thus profits can be positive in the absence of time-series predictability.
The decomposition above is useful for understanding the models. I should point out, however, that it is not unique; there are alternative ways to decompose profits that suggest different roles for auto-and cross-serial correlations. Suppose, for example, that firm-specific returns are persistent, but total returns are negatively autocorrelated because of market-wide reversals. In this case, a decomposition based on firm-specific returns might lead to different conclusions than the one above. In fact, we can make a stronger observation: momentum profits are (almost) equivalent to positive autocorrelation in assetspecific returns. To see this, define the asset-specific return as the difference between the asset's return and the equal-weighted index:
Substituting into Equation (3), the expected momentum profit is
where the second line uses the fact that market-adjusted returns sum to zero across stocks. Ignoring 2 , this equation shows that momentum profits, by construction, equal the average autocovariance of asset-specific returns.
Notice that Equation (7) does not help us understand the source of momentum profits: any model of momentum must imply that asset-specific returns are positively autocorrelated. Yet we will see below that momentum can be caused by a variety of underlying price behavior. It would be wrong to look at firm-specific returns, find they are positively autocorrelated, and conclude that firm-specific underreaction explains momentum. Firm-specific returns can be persistent either because investors underreact to asset-specific news or, as the models later show, because stocks covary too strongly. These two possibilities are fundamentally different, but the decomposition in Equation (7) cannot disentangle them. I discuss these issues further in Section 3.
2.2 Basic model of stock prices I now turn to the models. They are based on a simple representation of stock prices, adapted from Summers (1986) and Fama and French (1988) . Assume that the vector of log prices, p t , can be separated into permanent and transitory components (ignore dividends):
where q t follows a random walk and t is a stationary process with mean zero. I will be more precise about how q t and t covary with each other below. The logic behind this equation is that prices follow a random walk if expected returns are constant; time variation in expected returns implies that prices also contain a mean-reverting component. The random walk component, q t , can be thought of as the present value of expected dividends discounted at a constant rate. Innovations in q t will be interpreted as news about dividends, while innovations in t will be interpreted as news about expected returns [see Campbell (1991) ]. The vector q t follows the process
where is the expected drift and t is white noise with mean zero and covariance matrix . Combining with the equation above, continuously compounded returns equal
where t = t − t−1 . In general, shocks to dividends and shocks to expected returns will be correlated. The vector of unconditional expected returns is E r t = .
Constant expected returns
Begin with the benchmark case in which prices follow a random walk. In terms of the model above, t = 0 for every t. Returns are unpredictable, so first-order autocovariances are zero. Expected momentum profits from oneperiod returns equal
where 2 is the cross-sectional variance of expected returns. As we saw above, expected profits can be positive even without predictability because the portfolio tends to buy stocks with the highest expected returns. This effect will typically be small. Intuitively, realized returns provide an extremely noisy measure of unconditional means, so the momentum strategy chooses stocks primarily on noise in this model.
Underreaction
Momentum is typically associated with underreaction. To capture the idea that prices respond slowly to news, assume that the temporary component of prices is given by
where 0 < < 1 and t represents news about dividends [see Equation (9)]. Prices deviate from a random walk because they take many periods to fully incorporate news. When information arrives, prices immediately react by 1 − t . After k periods, prices reflect 1 − k of the news received at t. In this model, returns are given by
Underreaction decreases volatility and, more importantly, induces positive autocorrelation in returns. In particular, the first-order autocovariance matrix is
where is the dividend covariance matrix. Underreaction is the same for all stocks, implying that the autocovariance matrix is proportional to . The expression in parentheses is positive, so autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations will typically be positive. Momentum profits can be found using Lo and MacKinlay's (1990) decomposition:
Again, the expression in brackets must be positive because is a covariance matrix. Thus, underreaction leads to momentum.
Overreaction
Underreaction, along with positive autocorrelation, is the most common interpretation of momentum. Section 2.1, however, showed that lead-lag relations among stocks can also play a role. The final two models illustrate sources of cross-serial correlation in returns. Both models contain "excess" covariance among stocks: prices covary more strongly than dividends. The first model, in this subsection, assumes that investors overreact to news about one firm when evaluating the prospects of other firms. The second model assumes that the aggregate risk premium changes over time.
Recall that prices are represented by p t = q t + t , where the random walk component is q t = + q t−1 + t . To highlight the central ideas in this section, assume that shocks to dividends are completely asset specific, or cov( t = 2 I, where I is an identity matrix. Investors, however, mistakenly believe that news about one asset contains information about other assets. In particular, suppose the temporary component of price equals
where 0 < < 1 and B is an N ×N matrix with zero diagonal terms (investors understand how each asset's news affects in own value) and positive offdiagonals (investors overreact when valuing other assets). When information arrives, prices immediately react by I + B t . After k periods, prices reflect (I + k−1 B) of the news received at t. We will put additional restrictions on the matrix B below, but the idea is that B determines how much stocks covary with each other.
Fluctuations around a random walk are persistent but temporary. In particular, t = t−1 + B t , and returns equal r t = + I + B t + − 1 t−1 . Returns become more volatile and negatively autocorrelated. The variance of returns equals
which has positive off-diagonals, representing excess covariance. The firstorder autocovariance matrix is given by
which is everywhere negative since < 1 and B has only nonnegative terms. In other words, both the autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations are negative, consistent with the intuition that investors overreact to news. Without further restrictions on the matrix B, we cannot sign momentum profits: either the negative autocovariances or the negative cross-serial covariance might dominate. Intuitively it seems reasonable to assume that news about one firm would have a smaller, but positive, effect on other stocks. In particular, suppose that the matrix B equals
where b is a scalar such that 0 < b < 1. The matrix has zero diagonals and b everywhere else. The symmetry of the matrix is assumed for convenience. More importantly, the restriction on b implies that a shock to firm i has a smaller effect on other firms. Momentum profits equal
which is positive for 0 < b < 1. As long as the type of overreaction described in this section is not too large, momentum profits will be positive.
Time-varying risk premium
Overreaction is one possible source of excess covariance. Of course, stocks can also covary "too strongly" in the absence of any irrationality. In this section I assume that excess covariance is caused by time variation in the aggregate risk premium. Recall, for the last time, the basic model: p t = q t + t and q t = + q t−1 + asset prices should fluctuate together in a specific way. In particular, assume that price fluctuations around a random walk are perfectly correlated across assets, so that
where x t is a positively autocorrelated scalar with mean zero and is an N × 1 vector that describes the sensitivity of asset prices to changes in the risk premium. I assume that all elements of are positive, so expected returns move together over time. The notation is not accidental: if each asset's risk is constant, then price fluctuations around the random walk should be related to the asset's risk. Suppose, for example, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) holds and market betas are constant. Then changes in firms' expected returns are proportional to their betas, implying that temporary price fluctuations should also be closely linked to beta. Although I make no assumption here about the validity of the CAPM, the notation is chosen to capture this intuition.
In this model, stocks covary "too strongly" because they are sensitive to changes in the risk premium. Returns are given by r t = + t + x t , where x t = x t − x t−1 . It seems reasonable to assume that x t is positively correlated with t . The vector t measures news about dividends, while x t measures the price effect of changes in the risk premium. If cash flows and the risk premium move in opposite directions, x t and t will be positively related. This suggests, for example, that the market's expected return will be lower during expansions than recessions, consistent with empirical evidence [e.g., Fama and French (1989) , Campbell (1991) ].
Assume for simplicity that x t follows an AR(1) process, x t = x t−1 + t . The covariance between innovations of the dividend process and x t equals
where the last equality follows from the fact that t is uncorrelated with prior information. All elements of are assumed to be positive, consistent with the intuition in the previous paragraph. The covariance matrix of returns equals
Because all elements of cov r t are greater than , this equation implies that time variation in the risk premium increases the variances and covariances of returns. The first-order autocovariance matrix is cov r t r t−1 = x + − 1
where x < 0 is the autocovariance of x t . Like the prediction of the overreaction model, return autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations are both negative. Momentum profits take a particularly simple form:
where 2 is the cross-sectional variance of and is the cross-sectional covariance between and . This equation follows from the decomposition in Section 2.1.
To interpret Equation (25), recall that equals the covariance between dividends and temporary price movements, while measures the sensitivity of stock prices to changes in the risk premium. For positive profits, it must be true that stocks whose prices are sensitive to the risk premium (high i ) have cash flows that do not covary strongly with the risk premium (low i ). This condition is plausible. Suppose, for example, that small firms are sensitive to business conditions, so their cash flows covary strongly with the risk premium (high i ). At the same time, we might expect that the duration of a firm's cash flows determines how sensitive its price is to movements in the risk premium. If small stocks have a shorter duration than large stocks, then movements in the risk premium would have a smaller direct effect on their value (low i ). Under these conditions, a momentum strategy can earn positive profits. The point here is not to argue that we should expect momentum, but only to provide some intuition about the conditions that would be necessary.
Summary
The models above show that momentum can arise in a variety of ways. Underreaction is one possible source, but not the only; excess covariance can also lead to momentum. Distinguishing among the stories is difficult. Overreaction and a time-varying risk premium generate similar patterns of autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations; any attempt to disentangle these stories bumps up against Fama's (1970) joint-testing problem (it relies on an equilibrium model of returns). Even distinguishing between excess covariance and underreaction might not be easy if investors react differently to micro-and macroeconomic news. The next section shows that underreaction to asset-specific news and overreaction to macroeconomic news can generate patterns that are similar to excess covariance. Recognizing these difficulties, the remainder of the article investigates the autocorrelation patterns in returns to better understand momentum profits.
Autocorrelation Patterns in Returns
The models in Section 2 showed that momentum is consistent with a variety autocorrelation and cross-serial correlation patterns in returns. This section explores the patterns in detail for value-weighted industry, size, and B/M portfolios.
The earlier tests, in Section 1, considered strategies based on 12-month returns; I estimated profits for 1-18 months after the momentum portfolios were formed. This section follows a similar approach. I test whether a portfolio's annual return is correlated with its own and other portfolios' monthly returns for up to 18 months in the future. Thus I am interested in the autocovariance matrices k ≡ E r 12 t − r t+k − , where and are the vectors of expected 1-and 12-month returns, and k = 1 to 18.
Autocorrelations
The autocorrelation matrices are too large to report for every lag. Table 4 summarizes them for the industry portfolios and the size and B/M quintiles. The table reports the average, across the 18 lags, of the autocorrelation matrices. The portfolio used as the predictive variable changes as you move down the columns and the portfolio whose return is being predicted changes as you move across the rows (see the definition of k above). Statistical significance is difficult to assess analytically, so the tests are based on bootstrap simulations. The simulations replicate the empirical tests using artificial time series of returns, constructed by sampling with replacement from the actual return series. This procedure, repeated many times, creates a sampling distribution under the null.
The results in Table 4 are striking. The autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations are almost entirely negative and often statistically significant (roughly half of the estimates). Across the three sets of portfolios, the average autocorrelation equals −0 04 and the average cross-serial correlation equals −0 05. The estimates are similar for the three sets of portfolios, although the shorter sample used for B/M portfolios (May 1963-December 1999) means that their statistical significance is lower. The standard error of the estimates, not reported in the table, is approximately 0.025 for industry and size portfolios and 0.033 for B/M portfolios.
The table reveals a number of interesting patterns. For the size portfolios, the autocorrelations are most negative for the 3rd and 4th quintiles (−0 05 and −0 07, respectively). The estimates are closer to zero for the smallest and very largest stocks. The top three quintiles are negatively correlated with the future returns on all portfolios, while the smallest stocks are negatively correlated with the future returns on quintiles 4 and 5. These lead-lag relations are quite strong, especially the predictive power of quintile 5. Statistically, no simulation out of 5,000 yields an estimate as negative as that for quintile 5 leading quintile 1. Table 4 provides an interesting contrast with the momentum results in this and other articles. The literature suggests that momentum is one of the strongest asset pricing anomalies, while prior evidence of mean reversion in returns is weak [e.g., Fama and French (1988) , Richardson (1993) ]. Table 4 shows, however, that reversals, not continuations, completely dominate the autocorrelation matrices. Importantly, that observation is true for all three sets of portfolios, so it does not appear to be sensitive to the way portfolios are formed. The table reports autocorrelations (diagonals) and cross-serial correlations (off diagonals) for value-weighted industry, size, and B/M portfolios. The industries appear in the same order as in Table 1 . Autocorrelations equal the correlation between a portfolio's monthly return and its past 12-month return. Cross-serial correlations equal the correlation between a portfolio's monthly return and the past 12-month returns on other assets. The table reports the average correlation for lags of 1-18 months; the correlations are estimated individually for each lag and then averaged. The portfolio used as the predictive variable (12-month returns) changes as you move down the columns, and the portfolio being predicted changes as you move across the rows. Bold denotes estimates that are significant at the 5% level based on bootstrap simulations. The results are consistent with the excess-covariance models in Section 2. There is no evidence of persistence in returns, as suggested by models of underreaction. Alternatively, investors might simply underreact to portfoliospecific news but overreact to market news. Suppose, for example, that we decompose returns into r i t = i r m t + i t , where r m is negatively autocorrelated and i is positively autocorrelated. Assume, further, that r m i , and j are independent at all leads and lags (i = j). Then the autocovariance of r i is i = 2 i m + i and the cross-serial covariance between r i t and r j t−1 is ij = i j m . Cross-serial correlations pick up the reversals in market returns, and so will be negative. Autocorrelations pick up market reversals and the persistence in i ; they will be negative if market reversals dominate. These predictions are similar to the models in Section 2. Table 4 provides some guidance for distinguishing among the models. Before I discuss the evidence, it is useful to reflect on the portfolio-specific underreaction story. The intuition is that investors might react differently to idiosyncratic and market-wide news. However, I am not aware of any behavioral model that predicts this result. The recent articles by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) , and Hong and Stein (1999) do not differentiate between firm-specific and market-wide news. Indeed, the authors suggest that their models apply to both. Therefore, even if we believe that portfolio-specific underreaction explains momentum, Table 4 rejects the behavioral models as a general description of prices.
There is also a serious flaw in the underreaction story: the returns for size and B/M quintiles, and to a less extent industry portfolios, cannot reasonably be described as "idiosyncratic." Recall that the size and B/M portfolios are quite broad. Further, there is much evidence that their returns capture common risk factors in returns [Fama and French (1993) ]. Thus there seems little basis for predicting that investors will underreact to size-and B/M-specific news, but overreact to market news-both are macroeconomic. Notice that, in contrast, the models in Section 2 do not require that investors react differently to one type of news than another. Those models say that momentum profits and negative autocorrelation arise from the same source.
Empirically the size quintiles provide evidence against the portfolio-specific underreaction story. To see why, suppose that negative autocorrelation is driven entirely by market reversals. The autocorrelation of a portfolio should be a weighted average of the market and portfolio-specific return autocorrelations:
cor r it r it−1 = i cor r mt r mt−1 + 1 − i cor it it−1 (26) where i is the squared correlation between r i and r m . 6 I show later that cor it it−1 is similar across size quintiles, so most of the variation in cor(r it r it−1 ) should come from differences in i . In other words, if market reversals explain negative autocorrelation, portfolios with the least "idiosyncratic" risk should be the most negatively autocorrelated. Empirically that is not true. Quintile 5 easily has the least idiosyncratic risk ( i varies from 0.64 for quintile 1 to 0.98 for quintile 5), yet its autocorrelation is the second closest to zero. The difference with portfolio 4 is significant at the 1.8% level.
The cross-serial correlations are also difficult to reconcile with portfoliospecific underreaction. Using the results above, if market reversals explain cross-serial covariances, the covariance between r i t and r j t−1 is i j M . Collecting assets, cov(r t−1 r t = M , which is a matrix whose rows and columns are all proportional to the vector of market betas (ignore the diagonals). Similarly the matrix of cross-serial correlations should have rows that are proportional to the vector of correlations with the market portfolio.
7 Table 4 shows that this prediction is not true. For the size portfolios, the cross-serial correlations in the bottom row have exactly the wrong pattern; they should be closest to zero for the smallest stocks. Also, moving up the matrix, the pattern of coefficients reverses, so the rows are far from proportional to each other. The patterns for industry and B/M portfolios provide similar, but less distinct, problems for the underreaction story.
The cross-serial correlations could, in principle, be generated by either of the excess-covariance models in Section 2. Unfortunately the models are not developed precisely enough to make strong predictions about the pattern of autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations (other than the fact they should be negative). For the overreaction model, we would need to know which stocks are likely to exhibit the most excess covariance. For the time-varying risk premium model, we would need an equilibrium model of expected returns. I will provide evidence shortly using the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.
Autocorrelations and the forecast horizon
The summary statistics above are informative, but they mask changes in the autocorrelation matrices across lags. Table 5 explores how the autocorrelations change as the lag increases from 1 to 18 months. Specifically I estimate the slope coefficient when a portfolio's monthly return is regressed on its lagged annual return. I focus on autocorrelations because it is not practical to report cross-serial correlations for every lag. The table shows results for size quintiles, 15 industry portfolios, and 9 double-sorted size-B/M portfolios. I now use the double-sorted portfolios, in place of B/M quintiles, because they should be more informative. ( 2 ) 1 1 7 12 5 6 0 5 1 2 6 4 9 6 6 4 8 5 0
The table reports, for lags of 1-18 months, the OLS slope coefficient when a portfolio's monthly return is regressed on its own past 12-month return. The table shows estimates for value-weighted industry, size, and size-B/M portfolios, described more fully in Table 1 . Bold denotes estimates that are greater than 1.645 standard errors from zero or Wald statistics that are significant at the 10% level. a Statistics for May 1963-December 1999.
The autocorrelations again provide no evidence of persistence in returns, even at short horizons. The estimates are uniformly negative beyond month 1.
for industry and size portfolios and between 0.012 and 0.014 for size-B/M portfolios.) Interestingly, the estimates decline for about a year. For the size portfolios, the average is −0 007 in month 2, dropping to −0 019 by month 10 (standard errors of 0.008). The average is more than 1.75 standard errors below zero in months 8-13. Similarly, for industry portfolios, the average autocorrelation in month 2 is −0 003 and reaches a minimum of −0 017 in month 10 (standard errors of 0.007). The estimates are again more than 1.75 standard errors from zero in months 8-14. The U-shaped pattern in autocorrelations is not reflected in momentum profits, which decline steadily as the forecast horizon increases (see Table 2 ).
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Economically the estimates imply significant time variation in expected returns. Annual returns typically have a standard deviation between 20% and 25%. Therefore a two standard deviation increase in annual returns implies a 40-50 basis point drop in future returns if the slope is −0 01. Many of the estimates are this large. For the average size portfolio, the cumulative slope coefficient over 6 months is −0 043 and over 12 months is −0 135. The corresponding estimates are −0 023 and −0 104 for industry portfolios −0 044 and −0 112 for size-B/M portfolios. The implied changes in expected returns appear to be economically large.
Autocorrelations and momentum profits
From the evidence above, it is clear that persistence in returns does not explain momentum. Table 6 shows this formally using Lo and MacKinlay's (1990) decomposition. Recall from Section 2.1 that expected momentum profits equal
where k is the covariance between r t+k and r 12 t , and is the crosssectional covariance between expected 1-and 12-month returns. The first term depends on autocorrelations ("Auto" in the table), the second term depends on cross-serial correlations ("Cross"), and the last term picks up the effects of cross-sectional dispersion in unconditional means ("Means").
The standard errors require some explanation. For simplicity the table reports only the average standard error across the 18 lags. This is innocuous because the standard errors should all be the same (except that the sample sizes differ slightly). More importantly, the table shows two sets of estimates. The first set, "LM std error," is based on the asymptotic results of Lo and MacKinlay (1990, Appendix 2). The second set is based on bootstrap simulations, similar to those described earlier. The discussion below focuses on the bootstrap estimates.
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The table confirms the earlier results. Autocorrelations are always negative after month 1, and therefore reduce momentum profits. (The magnitudes are difficult to interpret because the size of the long-short position changes over time; see Table 2 for a rescaled portfolio that invests $1 long and $1 short every month.) For the industry portfolios, the autocovariance component of profits equals −2 51 (t-statistic = −0 94) in month 3 and declines to −6 70 (t-statistic = −2 52) in month 13. In comparison, the cross-serial component equals 4.80 (t-statistic = 1 87) in month 3 and rises to 6.87 (t-statistic = 2 68) in month 10. Total profits decline because cross-serial correlations do not fully offset changes in autocorrelations. Size and size-B/M portfolios show a similar pattern, but autocorrelations drop more slowly and total profits remain positive.
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Cross-sectional variation in expected returns has only a small effect on profits. For the industry portfolios, unconditional expected returns contribute 10 Surprisingly, the bootstrap standard errors are smaller than the LM estimates. I do not have a good explanation for the difference. One possibility is that the LM standard errors are consistent even when returns are serially correlated; the bootstrap standard errors are accurate only under the null. As a robustness check, I repeated the simulations allowing for heteroscedasticity [the equal-weighted index follows a GARCH(1,1) process and the volatility of all stocks moves together]. The standard errors from these simulations are quite similar to those from the i.i.d. simulations, with less than a 5% change in the estimates. between 0.11 and 0.15 to momentum profits. To put these in perspective, total profits range from 3.49 to −1 03. The evidence is similar for size and B/M portfolios (the double-sorted portfolios suggest a somewhat larger role for unconditional means). These results are opposite those of Conrad and Kaul (1998) . Conrad and Kaul argue that unconditional expected returns are the most important source of profits. However, their conclusions are based on individual stock returns, and it seems likely that noise in the estimates drives their results. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) discuss Conrad and Kaul's methodology in detail.
Market-adjusted returns
The analysis so far provides two facts about market-adjusted returns:
(1) momentum is equivalent to persistence in market-adjusted returns (Section 2.1), and (2) the lead-lag relations among stocks are not fully explained by reversals in market returns (Section 3.1). The first observation implies that market-adjusted returns must be positively autocorrelated, but that does not help distinguish between competing models. The second observation suggests that market-adjusted returns will exhibit interesting lead-lag patterns. Table 7 looks specifically at the predictability of market-adjusted returns, defined simply as the difference between the portfolio's return and the CRSP value-weighted index (the results are similar if I adjust for beta). The table shows, not surprisingly, that market-adjusted returns are positively autocorrelated. The estimates are highly significant for all three sets of portfolios. The average autocorrelation equals 0.08 for size portfolios, 0.06 for B/M portfolios, and 0.02 for industry portfolios.
12 The size quintiles show no clear pattern across portfolios, but the estimate is largest for quintile 1. The pattern is clearer for B/M portfolios, with autocorrelations greatest for high B/M stocks.
The cross-serial correlations are also strong. For the most part, the patterns reflect the contemporaneous correlation among portfolios. Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994) show that the lead-lag relation between two portfolios, i and j, should depend on their contemporaneous correlation: cor r i t−1 r j t = cor r j t−1 r j t × cor r i t r j t . This result, which also applies to market-adjusted returns, holds if r i t−1 does not contain incremental information about r j t beyond j's own past return. Without showing the details, the cross-serial correlations are generally, but not always, consistent with this prediction. (For a counterexample, note that the cross-serial correlations in a given column should always be less than autocorrelation in that column. This restriction is sometimes grossly violated; e.g., B/M quintiles 2 and 3 or industries 9, 13-15.) Table 7 Serial correlation, market-adjusted returns, Size portfolios The Table 7 contains one other piece of information about the predictability of market-adjusted returns. In the final row of each panel, I report the correlation between portfolio-specific returns and the lagged 12-month return on the CRSP value-weighted index. Interestingly, the table shows that market returns have strong predictive power. Focusing on size portfolios, the correlation is significantly negative for size quintiles 1-4 and significantly positive for quintile 5. The estimates are also significant for high B/M stocks and 5 of the 15 industries. In other words, portfolio-specific returns are not only predictable using the portfolio's own past returns, but they are also strongly predictable using the market return. That result is consistent with excess covariance in returns. It is not predicted by portfolio-specific underreaction, and helps explain why that model does not describe the autocorrelation patterns in Table 4 (see the discussion in 3.1).
The three-factor model
Either of the excess-covariance models could generate the serial correlation patterns in returns. So far I have not tried to distinguish between them. I take a step in this direction now, focusing on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.
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Before discussing the results, it is useful to provide some perspective on the tests. This article has considered, throughout, size and B/M portfolios that look much like the factors. The returns on size and B/M quintiles typically have three-factor R 2 s close to 95%. It should come as little surprise, then, that the factors themselves exhibit momentum, or that the factors explain much of the momentum in size and B/M portfolios. However, that finding does not answer the basic question: why does momentum-in either the factors or the portfolios-arise in the first place? If the three-factor model explains momentum, this supports the argument that macroeconomic factors are important. But I would argue anyway that the returns on size and B/M portfolios are best interpreted as macroeconomic. Thus while the tests are interesting, I have left them until the end because the autocorrelations are more informative about the source of momentum.
To test whether the three-factor model absorbs momentum, I focus directly on profits rather than the autocorrelation patterns in returns. Table 8 shows two sets for results. The first row shows momentum profits earned by the Fama and French factors. The strategy is similar to before, investing in the factors in proportion to their past 12-month returns. The remaining rows show risk-adjusted profits for industry, size, and B/M portfolios. The three-factor model is used to adjust returns in both the formation and holding periods; in other words, both the investment weights and the reported profits are based The table reports profits for momentum strategies based on past 12-month returns. The first row reports a strategy using the Fama and French (1993) factors. The remaining rows use the three-factor model to adjust returns during both the formation and postformation period. To isolate time-series patterns in the residuals, the intercepts in the preliminary three-factor regressions are permitted to be nonzero. The momentum strategy invests in assets in proportion to their abnormal returns, scaled so the weights on both sides of the trade sum to $1. Returns are measured in percent. Bold denotes average returns greater than 1.645 standard errors from zero. a Statistics for May 1963-December 1999.
on three-factor residuals. 14 The residuals for each portfolio are estimated from a full-sample regression, allowing the intercept to be nonzero.
The factors exhibit fairly strong momentum, although not as significant or persistent as those from size and B/M portfolios (see Table 2 ). Momentum profits decline from 0.61% in month 1 to 0.26% in month 9 (t-statistics = 3 68 and 1.61, respectively). The cumulative profit over the first six months is 2.60% (t-statistic = 2 81). This is similar to the profit from value-weighted size and B/M quintiles, but smaller than that from double-sorted size-B/M portfolios (3.43% for nine size-B/M portfolios, with a t-statistic = 4 11).
The three-factor model largely explains momentum in size and B/M portfolios, but not in industries. Over the first 6 months, industry profits equal 2.46% after adjusting for three-factor risk, down slightly from 3.04% for raw returns (the t-statistic remains above 4). This result is similar to the characteristic-adjusted profits in Table 3 [see also Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) ]. In contrast, momentum in size and B/M quintiles, as well as 9 or 25 double-sorted portfolios, greatly diminishes. Comparing raw and adjusted returns over the first 6 months, profits drop from 2.56% to 0.60% for size quintiles, from 2.45% to 0.47% for B/M quintiles, and from 3.23% to 0.40% for 25 size-B/M portfolios. Of these, only the estimate for size portfolios remains significant (t-statistic = 2 42). Overall, the three-factor model appears to explain most, if not all, of the momentum in size and B/M portfolios.
Conclusion
There is now considerable evidence of momentum in stock returns. With the exception of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) , the literature argues that firmspecific returns drive momentum. Further, theoretical models of momentum, such as Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) , and Hong and Stein (1999) , predict that stock returns will be positively autocorrelated.
This article shows that size and B/M portfolios exhibit momentum as strong as that in individual stocks and industries. That finding suggests that momentum is a pervasive feature of returns. Moreover, it implies that momentum cannot be attributed simply to firm-specific returns. The size and B/M portfolios are quite well diversified, so their returns reflect systematic risks. Macroeconomic factors, not firm-specific returns, must be responsible for size and B/M momentum.
In principle, size and B/M momentum might be explained by investor underreaction. However, that explanation seems unlikely from both an empirical and theoretical standpoint. Empirically the returns on industry, size, and B/M portfolios are negatively autocorrelated and cross-serially correlated. This rules out a simple underreaction model. However, it is potentially consistent with portfolio-specific underreaction, along with macroeconomic reversals, but this story also has a hard time explaining the evidence: (1) large stocks are weakly negatively autocorrelated, yet they predict other portfolios quite strongly (the cross-serial correlations are stronger than the underreaction story predicts); (2) market returns predict portfolio-specific returns on many size, B/M, and industry portfolios (a feature not anticipated by the underreaction story); and (3) the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model largely absorbs the serial correlation patterns in size and B/M portfolios.
Theoretically the underreaction story is unappealing because it says that investors react differently to portfolio-specific and market-wide news. No behavioral model predicts that result; indeed, I am aware of no model that explicitly distinguishes between firm-specific and market-wide returns. Perhaps more critically, news about size and B/M portfolios cannot reasonably be described as idiosyncratic. Thus a story in which investors react differently to idiosyncratic and macroeconomic news is not sufficient. Instead, a model needs to explain why investors underreact to some types of macroeconomic news, but overreact to others.
As an alternative to underreaction, I have proposed two models of excess covariance among stocks. Excess covariance means, loosely, that stock returns covary more strongly than dividends. In the first model, investors mistakenly believe that news about one firm contains information about other stocks. In the second model, stock prices react to changes in the aggregate risk premium. Both models generate autocorrelation patterns that are consistent with the data. Further, momentum and negative serial correlation come from the same underlying phenomenon.
There remain many unanswered questions about momentum. The most glaring omission of this article is evidence for individual stocks. Size and B/M momentum appears to be statistically distinct from individual-stock momentum. It would be useful to know whether they are caused by the same economic phenomenon, and in particular whether the excess-covariance models apply to individual stocks. There is evidence that individual-stock momentum might be explained by underreaction. For example, Bernard and Thomas (1990) argue that investors underreact to earnings announcements, although cross-serial correlation might complicate those results. The bottom line may well be that there are several sources of momentum in returns.
To close, I note that the evidence in this article should be interesting beyond its implications for momentum. The autocorrelation matrices, especially the cross-serial correlations, provide strong evidence of reversals in annual returns; the statistical significance is much stronger than suggested by previous studies [e.g., Fama and French (1988) , Richardson (1993) ]. Also, momentum in size and B/M portfolios, as well as in the Fama and French (1993) factors, implies that size and B/M effects change considerably over time; there would appear to be times when large stocks are expected to outperform small stocks, and when low B/M stocks are expected to outperform high B/M stocks. These observations could be important for investment decisions, testing asset pricing models, and evaluating the performance of mutual funds.
